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PERCENTAGE DEPLETION OF ADVANCE ROYALTIES AND
LEASE BONUSES UNDER I.R.C. SECTION 613A
Percentage depletion is a statutory deduction allowed to the owner
of an economic interest' in minerals. Under this method of depletion,
the allowance is computed as a specific percentage of the gross in-
come derived from the property.2 Oil and gas income qualified for this
deduction prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.1 The Act, however,
repealed the percentage depletion deduction on oil and gas income
with certain limited exemptions.4 One of these exemptions permits
independent producers and royalty owners to claim percentage deple-
tion on limited quantities of annual production. 5 The linchpin in qualify-
ing for the deduction is determining whether a payment is received
with respect to "production," even though this term is not defined
by the statute. The failure to define "production" has created con-
siderable uncertainty as to whether lease bonuses and advance
royalties continue to qualify for percentage depletion under the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975. Three courts have addressed the issue, but
they have failed to give a uniform definition of production or to agree
on the proper treatment of lease bonuses and advance royalties under
Internal Revenue Code section 613A.
In Engle v. Commissioner,' the Seventh Circuit allowed the tax-
payer to claim percentage depletion on advance royalties even though
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has
acquired by investment any interest in minerals in place or standing timber and secures,
by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral
or severance of the timber, to which he must look for a return of his capital. Treas.
Reg. S 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317.
2. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 181-82 (1982).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
4. The provisions were codified in the Internal Revenue Code at I.R.C. 5 613A
(1976). Section 613A provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the allowance
for depletion under section 611 with respect to any oil or gas well shall be com-
puted without regard to section 613.
(c) Exemption for Independent Producers and Royalty Owners
(1) In general-Except as provided in subsection (d), the allowance for deple-
tion under 611 shall be computed in accordance with section 613 with respect to-
(A) so much of the taxpayer's average daily production of domestic crude oil
as does not exceed the taxpayer's depletable oil quantity; and
(B) so much of the taxpayer's average daily production of domestic natural
gas as does not exceed the taxpayer's depletable natural gas quantity.
5. I.R.C. S 613A(c) (1976). Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the
Internal Revenue Act of 1954, as amended, codified at title 26 of the United States Code.
6. 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983).
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there had not yet been production on the leased property. The court
found that production required physical extraction but physical ex-
traction need not have preceded the receipt of income.7 Section 613A(c)
was treated as imposing a quantity limitation to be measured by the
current year's income rather than by physical extraction The Seventh
Circuit did not expressly define production, but its conclusion implied
that the term included past, current, and future physical extraction.
The Tax Court interpreted section 613A(c) in Glass v. Commis-
sioner.' In this case, the court concluded that lease bonuses were not
eligible for percentage depletion under section 613A(c) since the
bonuses were not received with respect to actual production.'" The
court defined production as actual physical extraction during the cur-
rent year." This definition does not allow current depletion of income
related to future physical extraction.
The third court which attempted to resolve the problem of
whether lease bonuses and advance royalties are exempted from the
general repeal of percentage depletion on oil and gas income was the
Court of Claims, in Farmar v. United States.'2 The court concluded
that lease bonuses were not eligible for percentage depletion, but it
gave production a broader definition than did the Tax Court. The
Court of Claims defined production as income from, or connected with,
actual extraction during the year.'" Lease bonuses were not within
the definition because the court did not consider the bonuses to be
sufficiently connected with actual extraction. The court, however,
stated that its definition of production possibly would allow a tax-
payer to claim percentage depletion on advance royalties.'4
These three cases present two basic issues. The first issue is
whether the term "production" permits current depletion of income
related to future physical extraction. The second issue is whether ad-
vance royalties are more closely related to actual physical production
than lease bonuses and, if so, whether this difference justifies different
tax treatment.
Factual Background
The Farmar, Glass, and Engle cases involved similar fact situa-
7. 677 F.2d at 601.
8. Id. at 600-02.
9. 76 T.C. 949 (1981).
10. Id. at 950.
11. Id. at 957.
12. 689 F.2d 1017 (Ct. C1. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983).
13. 689 F.2d at 1021.
14. Id. at 1025.
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tions. In each case, the taxpayers were independent producers or
royalty owners who claimed percentage depletion on the compensa-
tion they received for the execution of oil and gas agreements. 5 The
Commissioner disallowed the deductions, asserting that section 613A
repealed percentage depletion on the types of payments received by
the taxpayers.
The payments in both Farmar and Glass were classified as lease
bonuses. In Glass, the taxpayers owned the mineral interests in fee
simple in Texas. They received bonus payments of $139,940 in 1975.
These payments were due even in the absence of actual production.
The agreement also provided that future royalties would not be
reduced by the bonus payments. Producing wells were completed
during the year on all but one of the leased properties."
The agreement in Farmar resembled the agreement in Glass. The
taxpayers received the bonuses in 1976 as compensation for the lease
of mineral estates they owned in Texas. The bonuses were payable
in several yearly installments and were due even in the absence of
production. The lessee could not recover any part of the bonus
payments by abandoning the lease. During 1976, the taxpayers re-
ceived both lease bonuses and royalties."
Engle involved a slightly different factual situation. The taxpayer
was the lessee of two oil and gas leases. In 1975, he assigned his in-
terest in these leases to other companies interested in their develop-
ment. The taxpayer received $7,600 and retained an overriding royalty
interest as compensation for the execution of the agreement. The court
characterized the payment as advance royalties. During the year of
payment, there was no production, discovery, or exploratory work done
on the properties.'8
Lease Bonuses and Advance Royalties
An oil and gas lease typically compensates the mineral owner at
the time of execution of the lease and provides the mineral owner
with a royalty interest.'9 The initial compensation generally is referred
to as a lease bonus or advance royalty. A lease bonus is the com-
pensation paid by the lessee for the right to exploit the land for oil
and gas.2 ° The payment is due whether or not there is production
15. Engle, 677 F.2d at 595; Glass, 76 T.C. at 950; Farmar, 689 F.2d at 1018.
16. 76 T.C. at 950.
17. 689 F.2d at 1018.
18. 677 F.2d at 595.
19. 1 L. FISKE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS S 2.05.(1982).
20. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 111 (1932); Houston Farms Dev. Co. v. United
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and, ordinarily, it is computed on a per-acre basis. An advance royalty
contains many of the characteristics of a lease bonus. Like a bonus,
an advance royalty is paid for the right to exploit the land for oil
and gas."' It provides the mineral owner a royalty computed on the
basis of a specific number of units, whether or not extracted within
the year. 2 The advance payments are then applied against royalties
due on minerals extracted thereafter.
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, lease bonuses and ad-
vance royalties were considered to have a similar meaning, and one
term was even used to define the other.' Both payments were de-
fined as compensation paid to the lessor for the diminution in value
of the leased property, 4 and therefore both were eligible for deple-
tion. Despite this, the Court of Claims suggested that an advance
royalty "may possibly be considered somewhat different, and more
closely related to actual production" than a lease bonus, and therefore
it still may be eligible for percentage depletion under section 613A."
This fact-makes it necessary to attempt to distinguish a lease bonus
from an advance royalty, as the characterization of the payment may
have tax significance.
The courts historically have distinguished between payments given
for the exploitation of minerals and payments given for other con-
sideration. An example of a payment in the latter category is the
delay rental. The delay rental grants the lessee the privilege of defer-
ring commencement of drilling operations or production. The payment
is considered to be in the nature of liquidated damages or a penalty
for the failure to drill upon or exploit the property." Lease bonuses,
however, can not be distinguished from advance royalties on this basis.
Both are examples of payments that fall in the former category since
they both are considered to be given for the exploitation of minerals. 7
States, 131 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1942); 4 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION S 24.24 (1980).
21. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 111 (1932); Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S.
404 (1940).
22. Kleberg v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941); Treas. Reg. S 1.612-3(b)(1) (1960).
23. In Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 409 (1940), the Court stated, "[Clash
bonus payments, when included in a royalty lease, are regarded as advance royalties
and are given the same tax consequences." (emphasis added). See also C. BREEDING
& A. BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES S 4.02 (1983); 1 L. FISKE, supra
note 19, S 2.07.
24. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
25. Farmar, 689 F.2d at 1025.
26. Sneed v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 478, 482 (1935); 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 2, at 175.
27. The terms "bonus" and "rental" also are defined by the Louisiana Mineral
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Attempts to distinguish advance royalties from lease bonuses are
further complicated by the fact that the exact form of the advance
royalty may vary. A common variation of the advance royalty is
derived from the "minimum royalty" agreement. Under this type of
agreement, the lessee guarantees the lessor a minimum annual royalty.
The payment is due regardless of actual physical extraction during
the year, with the entire payment being considered in the nature of
a royalty. 28 The courts have rejected attempts by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to treat as a delay rental the excess of the amount
paid over the amount earned based on actual production. 9
The major distinctions which exist between lease bonuses and ad-
vance royalties are that lease bonus payments are computed on a per-
acre basis while advance royalties are computed on units of produc-
tion and advance royalties, unlike lease bounses, may be recouped
through future production. The latter distinction, however, is less clear
when lease bonuses are compared to minimum royalties, because the
"minimum" payment, like the lease bonus, may not be traceable to
a specific unit physically extracted from the property. Lease bonuses
and advance royalties are regarded as the same in all other respects.
Depletion of Lease Bonuses and Advance Royalties Prior to 1975
The depletion allowance has been part of the tax laws since 1913.
The Revenue Act of 1913 contained a provision permitting a
"reasonable allowance for depletion . . . not to exceed [in the case
of mines] 5 per centum of the gross value."3 The depletion computa-
tion was based on the greater of the cost of the property or its market
value on March 1, 1913. Typically, this statutory limitation restricted
the depletion allowance to a fixed percentage of gross income.3 The
five-percent limitation, however, was short-lived; it was removed by
the Revenue Act of 1916, which provided for a "reasonable allowance,
Code. "Bonus" means money or other property given for the execution of a mineral
lease, except interests in production from or attributable to property on which the
lease is given. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:213(3) (1974).
"Rental" means money or other property given to maintain a mineral lease in the
absence of drilling or mining operations or production of minerals. "Rental" does not
include payments classified by a lease as constructive production. LA. MIN. CODE: LA.
R.S. 31:213(4) (1974). However, in determining the federal income tax treatment of these
items, the definition of the interest created by state law may be of only limited value,
as the time and manner of taxation is determined by the federal statute. Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
28. McFaddin v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 395 (1943).
29. Id.
30. Ch. 16, S II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 172-73 (1913).
31. J. LICHTBLAU, THE OIL DEPLETION ISSUE 29 (1959).
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not to exceed the actual cost of discovery, or in the case of oil and
gas mines discovered prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market value
on that date.""2 This statute reflected a policy of limiting the deple-
tion allowance to the actual cost of discovery (except in the case of
oil and gas wells discovered prior to March 1, 1913).
The Revenue Act of 1918 changed this policy. Following World
War I, Congress became aware of the strategic importance of oil."3
In an effort to encourage exploration, Congress revised the depletion
allowance to give all producers the option of choosing between a deple-
tion deduction based on either cost or market value determined within
thirty days of discovery." By electing the market value (or discovery
value) method, the taxpayer received a "stepped-up" depletable basis
which was completely unrelated to actual cost. This increased basis
allowed the oil producer to claim a greater depletion allowance than
would have been allowed if the deduction had been based on actual
cost. The theory of this legislation was that the tax savings generated
by the higher depletion allowance would be reinvested in additional
exploration.35
The benefits of discovery depletion, however, were limited by Con-
gress both in 1921 and in 1924. In 1921, the depletion allowance was
limited to the oil producer's profit from each mineral property owned
for the year.' The change was designed to prevent oil producers from
using the depletion allowance to offset profits from other separate
and distinct lines of business. 7 The allowance was further reduced
by the Revenue Act of 1924, which limited the depletion allowance
to a maximum of 50 percent of the net profits from each property.
While Congress approved of the incentives created by the
discovery value method, computation of the depletion deduction proved
to be administratively cumbersome and complex. 9 The taxpayer and
the Treasury Department frequently disagreed on the value of the
discovery.' Many of the valuation procedures were left to the discre-
tion of the engineers. To remedy this problem, Congress once again
amended the depletion statute. The Revenue Act of 1926 provided
32. Ch. 463, S 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 768 (1916).
33. 56 CONG. REC. 10,539-10,542 (1918).
34. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, S 214(a)(9), 40 Stat. 1057, 1078-79 (1919).
35. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF DEPLETION ALLOWANCE 2 (Comm. Print 1950).
36. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, S 214(a)(10), 42 Stat. 227, 241 (1921).
37. S. REP. No. 273, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1921).
38. Ch. 234, S 204(c), 43 Stat. 254, 260 (1924).
39. S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1926).
40. J. LICHTBLAU, supra note 31, at 38.
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for the computation of the depletion allowance as the greater of either
a percentage of the gross income from the property or the actual cost
per unit produced. 1 The percentage rate of depletion was intended
to approximate the deduction which would have been available under
the discovery value method. The Senate Finance Committee proposed
25 percent as a rate to substitute for the discovery value deduc-
tion, while the Senate amendment proposed 30 percent.'2 A com-
promise rate of 27 1/2 percent, as recommended by the House Con-
ference Committee, eventually was enacted.
4 3
Initially, it was unclear whether lease bonuses were eligible for
depletion. The United States Supreme Court answered this question
in Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet"' and Burnet v. Harmel."5 Murphy Oil
arose under the Revenue Act of 1918. The taxpayer had received a
bonus payment of $5,173,595 in a previous year, but it had not re-
duced its basis in the mineral interest by the amount of depletion
allocable to that payment. The Court agreed with the Commissioner
that both bonuses and royalties involve a return of capital investment
in oil in the ground for which a depletion allowance must be made."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated, "A distinction between
royalties and bonus, which would allow a depletion deduction of the
former but tax the latter in full as income, when received ... would
deny the 'reasonable allowance for depletion' which the statute
provides."47 The question also was addressed in Harmel. The precise
issue was whether a lease bonus was ordinary income or the sale of
a capital asset. 8 The Court held that the bonus payment was similar
to a royalty and, therefore, ordinary income subject to depletion."9
Murphy Oil and Harmel arose before the Revenue Act of 1926
amended the Code to allow a statutory percentage of gross income
as a depletion deduction. The Commissioner originally took the posi-
tion that percentage depletion was allowable on lease bonuses only
41. Ch. 27, S 204(c)(2), 44 Stat. 9, 16 (1926). The pertinent provisions of this statute
are as follows:
In the case of oil and gas wells the allowance for depletion shall be 27 1/2 per
centum of the gross income from the property during the taxable year ... except
that in no case shall the depletion computation be less than it would be if com-
puted without reference to this paragraph.
42. H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1926).
43. Id.
44. 287 U.S. 299 (1932).
45. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
46. 287 U.S. at 302.
47. Id. at 302.
48. 287 U.S. at 105.
49. Id. at 111.
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if at the time it was received, the future production of oil and gas
from the property was practically assured or the property became
productive during that taxable year." However, in the case of cost
depletion, the Commissioner required no development or production
of any oil or gas. The Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's
position in Herring v. Commissioner," in which the Court allowed the
percentage depletion deduction in the year of receipt, regardless of
the probability of future production or actual production during the
taxable year. The Court found "neither statutory authority nor logical
justification for withholding [the deduction] in the one [percentage
depletion] and granting it in the other [cost depletion]." 2 The Court
reserved judgment as to the income tax liability in the year of ter-
mination of the lease, where there had been no production."
After the Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's position,
he issued a pronouncement that was consistent with Herring.' Addi-
tionally, the Commissioner stated that when there had been no pro-
duction under the lease, the taxpayer was required to restore the
depletion deduction to income in the year the lease was terminated.5
The Commissioner's "recapture rule" was affirmed by the Court in
Douglas v. Commissioner."
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975
Percentage depletion of lease bonuses and advance royalties con-
tinued, without change, from the date of the Herring decision until
the enactment of section 613A. Section 613A generally repealed the
percentage depletion deduction, but it provides an exemption for a
limited amount of an independent producer's or a royalty owner's
average daily production.57 Because the exemption is available only
if there is production, the Commissioner has taken the position that
lease bonuses and advance royalties are not within the narrow ex-
emption of section 613A. 8
The Commissioner bases his conclusion on his interpretation of
50. G.C.M. 11,384, XII-1 C.B. 64 (1933), revoked by G.C.M. 14,448, XIV-1 C.B. 98 (1935).
51. 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
52. Id. at 328.
53. Id.
54. G.C.M. 14,448, XIV-1 C.B. 98 (1935).
55. Id.
56. 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
57. I.R.C. S 613A(c) (1976).
58. Rev. Rul. 81-44, 1981-1 C.B. 384; see also Engle v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d at
595; Farmar v. United States, 689 F.2d at 1018; Glass v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 950.
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congressional intent. He believes that Congress, by using the term
"production," intended to require a direct link between payments
received by the taxpayer and actual physical extraction in order for
the payments to qualify for percentage depletion. 9 Additionally, the
Commissioner believes that this direct link is necessary in the same
year or the year immediately preceding that in which payment is
received. Thus, the Commissioner would allow percentage depletion
on payments received in the same year as physical extraction and
on payments received in a subsequent year when physical extraction
occurred in the immediately preceding year." Lease bonuses and ad-
vance royalties would not qualify for percentage depletion under this
definition because these payments typically precede physical
extraction.
The taxpayer in each of the three cases did not interpret con-
gressional intent so restrictively. These taxpayers assert that the
reference to section 613 in section 613A evidences a congressional
intent to link production to gross income. Under this interpretation,
gross income is converted to units of production and the limitations
of section 613A(c)(5) are applied." This definition of production allows
the taxpayer to claim percentage depletion on income directly linked
to current physical extraction, as well as on income related to future
physical extraction. This definition, like the Commissioner's, is derived
primarily from the legislative history.
Legislative History
The original purpose of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was to
stimulate the economy. 2 The Act provided for a reduction in individual
income taxes, a tax credit for the purchase of new homes, and cer-
tain other provisions designed to accomplish its goal. 3 The Act
originally did not contain any provisions for the repeal of percentage
depletion." The Act, however, was under consideration in Congress
following the oil embargo, during which time several members of Con-
gress were attacking the profits of the major oil companies. The
remarks of one senator during the floor debates on the Tax Reduc-
59. Rev. Rul. 81-44, supra note 58; Engle, 677 F.2d at 597; Farmar, 689 F.2d at
1019; Glass, 76 T.C. at 951.
60. Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.613A-3(a)(4) ex.(7) (proposed May 13, 1977).
61. See Engle v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d at 597; Farmar v. United States, 689
F.2d at 1019.
62. Bravenec, Continued Availability of Percentage Depletion on Oil and Gas, 23
OIL & GAS TAX Q. 204 (1975).
63. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
64. Id.
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tion Act of 1975 reflected the mood of some members of Congress:
"[The repeal of percentage depletion] closes the most flagrant single
loophole in the Internal Revenue Code, a loophole that has been the
symbol for a generation of the way the tax laws can favor the wealthy
and the special interest groups .... ,15
The major oil companies were the obvious target of the percent-
age depletion repeal provisions. This view is supported by the fact
that the repeal provisions affected only oil and gas income and not
other types of mineral income.6 The original floor amendment,
however, not only repealed percentage depletion available to the major
oil companies but also repealed percentage depletion available to in-
dependent producers and royalty owners. 7 An attempt in the House
to exempt a limited quantity of oil and gas income from the repeal
provisions failed. 8 In the Senate, the bill was amended to provide
an exemption for independent producers and royalty owners. 9 This
limited exemption was retained in the conference bill and eventually
enacted.7" The House and Senate debates of the bill discussed the
independent producers exemption. The debates primarily dealt with
whether there should be an exemption and, if so, the quantity to be
exempted. 1 The debates neither addressed the treatment to be given
lease bonuses and advance royalties nor defined the term "produc-
tion." Congress's failure to expressly discuss these problems has
created difficulties with the statute. Although statements can be found
to support either view, it remains unclear whether Congress intended
for exempt production to be measured by gross income or by physical
extraction." Although the treatment of lease bonuses and advance
65. 121 CONG. REC. 8,865 (1975) (Remark of Sen. Hollings).
66. Section 613A(a) provides: "the allowance for depletion under section 611 with
respect to any oil or gas well shall be computed without regard to section 613." (em-
phasis added).
67. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 4638, 4651 (1975).
68. 121 CONG. REC. 4639-41, 4645 (1975).
69. 121 CONG. REC. 7770-73, 7807, 7813 (1975).
70. H. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 54, 132-34.
71. See generally, 121 CONG. REC. 4,638-58, 7,770-7,820, 8,860-81, & 8,895-8,946 (1975);
Depletion Allowance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the Senate Finance
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
72. Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, stated that the
conference version retained a sizeable amount of depletion for the independent pro-
ducer. 121 CONG. REC. 8,860 (1975). Senator Mathias' statements, however, seem to
indicate a requirement of production: "[twenty-two] percent depletion on oil and gas
will be available on the first 2,000 barrels of oil in 1975 .... 121 CONG. REC. 8,873
(1975). In the House debate on the conference bill, Representative Ullman said: "The
conference bill retains some percentage depletion for the independen[t] [producer] but
at a reduced rate." 121 CONG. REC. 8,918 (1975) (emphasis added).
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royalties was not addressed specifically in the 1975 legislative history,
it was discussed in a similar proposal during the 1974 session of
Congress." The proposed bill would have imposed a windfall profits
tax, phased out percentage depletion, and made certain other tax
adjustments." The proposal, which would have exempted a limited
quantity of oil and gas production, but not lease bonuses, was
explained in the House report:
[The reduced rate] applies only to gross income attributable to
oil which is sold or removed from the premises and not to other
types of depletable income. For example, a lease bonus paid to
the lessor of mineral lands in a lump sum or in installments is
independent of any actual production from the lease and thus
would not be within any of the exemptions.7 1
The bill, however, was neither introduced in nor enacted by the
Senate. Additionally, the House report was not referred to during
the 1975 debates.
Administrative Pronouncements
The Internal Revenue Service has issued proposed regulations and
two revenue rulings to explain the provisions of section 613A. While
these pronouncements are not binding on the courts," they frequently
are relied on in interpreting ambiguous statutes.
7
The treatment of lease bonuses was addressed in Revenue Ruling
81-44." In this ruling, the Internal Revenue Service stated, "Percen-
tage depletion under section 613A(c) of the Code is allowable only
with respect to production.," The Service concluded that the lease
bonus involved did not qualify for percentage depletion since the pay-
ment was due independent of production. The ruling did not discuss
if a lease bonus would be considered as given "with respect to pro-
duction" where there was actual production under the lease.
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, percentage depletion could
be claimed only if there eventually was actual production. The tax-
payer was allowed to deplete the income in the year received,"° but
73. H.R. 17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
74. Id.
75. H.R. REP. No. 1502, 93d Cong., 2d Session 46 (1974).
76. Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249, 254 (8th Cir. 1958); 1 J. MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION S 3.21 (1981).
77. Farmar, 689 F.2d at 1024 n.12; Gino v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 833, 835 (9th
Cir. 1976).
78. 1981-1 C.B. 384.
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
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he was required to restore the depletion deduction to income in the
year of termination of the lease if the property later proved to be
unproductive." The change asserted by the Internal Revenue Service
in Revenue Ruling 81-44 is that the payment must be dependent on
actual physical extraction to qualify for percentage depletion under
section 613A. An apparent additional requirement is that physical ex-
traction precede or be concurrent with the receipt of income.2
The Internal Revenue Service also issued Revenue Ruling 81-266,'
which dealt with the "bonus exclusion rule." Under the bonus exclu-
sion rule, the lessee is required to exclude from his depletable gross
income an allocable portion of current gross income paid as a bonus
in advance of production to the lessor.' The purpose of this adjust-
ment is to prevent both the lessee and the lessor from claiming percen-
tage depletion on the same gross income. Revenue Ruling 81-266 held
that Revenue Ruling 81-44 did not alter the bonus exclusion rule.
Revenue Ruling 81-44 and Revenue Ruling 81-266 appear to be
inconsistent. The bonus exclusion rule requires the lessee to reduce
his gross income by bonus payments (the reduction is allocated over
the estimated period of production from the property), yet the lessor
cannot claim percentage depletion on bonus payments since they are
not received with respect to production. These two rulings, in effect,
state that the payment made by the lessee is related to production,
but the same payment, when received by the lessor, is unrelated to
production. The Internal Revenue Service attempts to reconcile these
two positions by claiming that section 613A requires physical extrac-
tion during the same year that payment is received.85 This conclu-
sion, however, is not supported by the language of the statute.
The Internal Revenue Service also has issued proposed regula-
tions explaining the provisions of section 613A. The examples accom-
panying regulation section 1.613A-3, inter alia, illustrate the provi-
sions of the statute. Example 788 illustrates the problem which arises
81. Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
82. See Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.613A-3(a)(4) ex.7 (proposed May 13, 1977).
83. 1981-2 C.B. 139.
84. Id. This principle was illustrated by Rev. Rul. 79-73, 1979-1 C.B. 218, amplified
by Rev. Rul. 81-44, 1981-1 C.B. 384, as follows: The lessee pays the lessor a bonus
of $200 in year one. In year two, there is production on the property of 100y units
out of the total estimated recoverable reserves of 1,000y units. The lessee is required
to exclude from depletable gross income of the year $20 (100/1000 x $200). This amount,
however, is not excluded from taxable income.
85. Rev. Rul. 81-266, supra note 83.
86. Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.613A-3(a)(4) ex.(7) (proposed May 13, 1977).
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when physical extraction occurs in 1975, but the proceeds are not
reported in the taxpayer's income until 1976. In this case, the physical
extraction is considered as occurring in 1976.7
Example 488 illustrates the problems encountered with advance
royalties. In the example, the taxpayer receives annual payments of
$100 recoupable out of future production. The income based on actual
production is $60 in 1975 and $140 in 1976. The example concludes
that only $60, the amount of actual production, is eligible for percen-
tage depletion in 1975 and only $100 is eligible for percentage deple-
tion in 1976. The $100 is the amount of advance royalty income received
in 1976 relating to production occurring in that year. The example
permanently denies percentage depletion on the $40 of advance royalty
income received in 1975 relating to physical extraction occurring in
1976.89
Example 4 and example 7 can be factually distinguished. In ex-
ample 7 physical extraction precedes the reporting of income, while
in example 4 the reverse occurs. However, it is difficult to logically
distinguish the examples. Provided there is physical extraction dur-
ing the term of the lease, the tax treatment of each payment should
be the same whether extraction precedes or follows payment.
Analysis of Court Decisions
The Tax Court, the Court of Claims, and the Seventh Circuit all
have wrestled with the problem of interpreting section 613A. In Engle,
the taxpayer argued that congressional intent supported his position
that advance royalties were exempt from the general repeal of percen-
tage depletion. The taxpayer relied upon the conference report, which
stated, "[T]he Senate amendment retains percentage depletion at 22
percent on a permanent basis . . . ."' The taxpayer argued that by
using the word "retains," Congress did not intend to change the
existing allowance of depletion for independent producers and royal-
ty owners. Congress, according to the taxpayer's argument, only in-
tended to place a limitation on the amount of production that qualifies
for the exemption; Congress did not otherwise intend to change the
percentage depletion deduction."
87. Id.
88. Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.613A-3(a)(4) ex.(4) (proposed May 13, 1977).
89. Id.
90. H. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 54,132 (emphasis added).
91. 677 F.2d at 597.
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The Commissioner similarly based his position on congressional
intent. The Commissioner referred to statements made during the floor
debates indicating that Congress was concerned with further explora-
tion and development and that the allowance of percentage depletion
on payments received prior to physical extraction would be inconsis-
tent with this policy.2 The Commissioner also relied on the House
proposal made in the previous congressional session. 3 This proposal
would have repealed percentage depletion with certain limited
exemptions." One of the exemptions would have allowed a limited
quantity of production received by an independent producer to qualify
for percentage depletion. 5 Lease bonuses were not included within
the limited exemption. The Commissioner argued that Congress had
the same intent when it enacted the limited independent producer
and royalty owner exemption as part of the Tax Reduction Act of
1975. The Commissioner also considered percentage depletion of ad-
vance royalties repealed because of the similar treatment historically
given advance royalties and lease bonuses."7
In analyzing the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit did not
rely on the 1974 proposal. 8 The court stated that it could not, "as
a matter of common sense,"99 conclude that congressional intent had
remained unchanged between 1974 and 1975. This position was rein-
forced by the fact that the 1974 proposal was never introduced in
the Senate, yet it was the Senate's version of the bill that provided
an exemption for independent producers and royalty owners. Beyond
specifically rejecting the 1974 report, the court stated that both the
Commissioner and the taxpayer had presented "reasonable interpreta-
tions" of the congressional intent. 10 However, in concluding that sec-
tion 613A places a limitation on production and does not require
physical extraction as a prerequisite to the percentage depletion deduc-
tion, the court found "little guidance" in the legislative history.'1
The Seventh Circuit also analyzed the statutory language of sec-
tion 613A. The court interpreted the term "production" as meaning
more than "actual physical extraction during the taxable year."'0 2 The
92. Id. at 599.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
95. H.R. 17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
96. H. REP. No. 1502, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1974).
97. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
98. 677 F.2d at 598.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 599.
101. Id. at 601.
102. Id.
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court felt that such a narrow definition of production would create
problems when the receipt of income and physical extraction oc-
curred in separate years. 03 The court referred to Judge Fay's dissent
in the Tax Court to illustrate this problem. 0 ' The dissent had dealt
with problems arising both when physical extraction preceded income
and when income preceded physical extraction. Under a narrow defini-
tion of production, the gross income in either case would not qualify
for percentage depletion since physical extraction and the receipt of
income would not occur in the same year. The definition adopted by
the proposed regulations, however, would allow percentage depletion
when physical extraction preceded income, but deny the depletion
allowance when income preceded physical extraction.'5 Production
under this definition, would include past and current physical extrac-
tion, but not future physical extraction. In dissent, Judge Fay rejected
such a definition, stating that it was not based on either the statutory
language or logic, but on a "capricious" interpretation of the statute.'0
The Seventh Circuit never precisely defined production. The court,
however, did refer to Judge Fay's dissent in the Tax Court. Judge
Fay's dissent defined production as "extraction (past, current or future)
properly attributable to a taxpayer's taxable year as measured by
the income received in that year."'0 7 He gave four reasons in support
of this definition. First, placing extraction in a year with reference
to income interprets the statute without reading a myriad of calcula-
tions and carryovers into it. An interpretation which would base pro-
duction on actual physical extraction would require the taxpayer to
maintain detailed production records and to prepare various carryover
schedules reconciling physical extraction records with the reporting
of gross income. Second, an interpretation which would restrict pro-
duction to current or past extraction, while excluding future produc-
tion, would overrule prior case law without a clear statutory man-
date. Third, the reference to section 613(a) in section 613A(c) made
it clear that Congress intended that production be tied to income.
Finally, he believed this interpretation was consistent with the
legislative history.
Judge Fay believed that the position taken by the Commissioner
was a reversion to the pre-Herring position explained in General
103. Id.
104. 76 T.C. 915, 940 (1981).
105. Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.613A-3(a)(4) ex.(7) with S 1.613A-3(a)(4) ex.(4) (pro-
posed May 13, 1977).
106. 76 T.C. 915, 943 (1981), rev'd, 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 722 (1983).
107. 76 T.C. at 945.
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Counsel Memorandum (G.C.M.) 11,384.18 This conclusion is not com-
pletely accurate. While the application of the pre-Herring rule to the
facts in Engle would obtain the same result, the Commissioner's
reasoning is different. Currently, the Commissioner is not basing his
denial of percentage depletion on the probability of future extraction
(as he did under G.C.M. 11,384), but on the lack of a direct link be-
tween the payment received and the quantity physically extracted.
Production in the year of receipt, while changing the result under
G.C.M. 11,384, has no effect under the Commissioner's interpretation
of section 613A. 109
The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that section 613A was am-
biguous and found nothing in the statute which elucidated whether
the term "production" was intended to be a prerequisite to or merely
a limitation on the depletion allowance. Since an interpretation of pro-
duction which would require extraction as a prerequisite to the deduc-
tion would be a drastic change without any clear legislative expres-
sion, the court rejected this reading.11
After the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Engle, the Court
of Claims addressed the same issue in Farmar. The Court of Claims
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the legislative history provided
"minor help." However, unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Court of Claims
relied on House Report 1502, the House Ways and Means Committee
report from the 1974 congressional session. The court considered the
language of this report to be "similar" to the language enacted in
section 613A and, therefore, of some value."' The court explained its
reliance on the report as follows: "We do not lean heavily on the
earlier report [House Report 1502], but we do not disregard it en-
tirely (as the Seventh Circuit did)."1 1 2
The Court of Claims also agreed with the Seventh Circuit that
the statutory language was ambiguous."' In interpreting section 613A,
the court relied on the specific wording of the statute. The court said
that repeated use of the term "production" by Congress indicated an
intent to allow depletion only with respect to income derived from
or connected with actual extraction during the taxable year.1 The
Farmar taxpayers had argued that lease bonuses were sufficiently
108. XII-1 C.B. 64 (1933), revoked by G.C.M. 14,448, XIV-1 C.B. 98 (1935).
109. See Rev. Rul. 81-44, 1981-1 C.B. 384.
110. 677 F.2d at 602.
111. 689 F.2d at 1024.
112. Id. at 1023.
113. Id. at 1020.
114. Id. at 1021.
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tied to production because of their economic relationship to royalties.
They claimed that an increase in the royalty rate resulted in a
decrease in the lease bonus payment."5 The court, however, viewed
lease bonuses differently: "[T]he lease bonus is not tied to actual produc-
tion, but only to the parties' expectation of production.... The lease
bonus, while it may affect the predetermined royalty rate, is not adjusted
with or sufficiently connected to actual production levels.""1 '
The court's statutory analysis did not interpret the reference to
section 613 as creating a requirement that production be measured
with respect to income. Instead, this reference was interpreted as
creating a two-tier test."' The first tier of the test involved applying
the 50 percent of gross income limitation of section 613 to the deple-
tion computation. The second, more difficult tier required the tax-
payers to demonstrate that this income related to actual production
not exceeding the barrel limitations. This same argument was
presented to the Seventh Circuit in Engle, but that court found
"nothing in the statutory language [which] specifically [supported] the
... conclusion that Congress intended to incorporate only the methods
of calculating 'gross income from the property' and 'taxable income
from the property' while abandoning gross income as the basis of the
deduction."' 8
The taxpayers in Farmar interpreted section 613A as establishing
only a quantity limitation and not a production precondition." 9 This
interpretation would permit percentage depletion of lease bonuses pro-
vided there was production during the life of the lease. The Court
of Claims, however, thought that such an interpretation would pre-
sent problems unanswered by the statute. One such problem was that
the statute does not provide a method of converting bonus income
into "average daily production."" Interestingly, this same court would
allow cost depletion on lease bonus income."' The cost depletion com-
putation requires that the taxpayer allocate the adjusted basis of the
property between the lease bonus and the estimated future royalties."
115. Id. at 1021-22.
116. Id. at 1022 (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. 677 F.2d at 600.
119. 689 F.2d at 1019.
120. Id. at 1021 n.7.
121. Id. at 1018 n.2.
122. Cost depletion on bonus income is computed by multiplying the taxpayer's
adjusted depletable basis by a ratio, the numerator of which is the lease bonus and
the denominator of which is the sum of the lease bonus and royalties expected to
be received. The formula can be illustrated as follows:
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The theory of this computation is that the sum of the lease bonuses
and the future royalties represents the total compensation to be re-
ceived from the property. The theory considers the taxpayer as receiv-
ing two payments-a royalty and a proportionate share of the lease
bonus-for each unit extracted from the lease and allows the deduc-
tion when the payment is received. The court did not explain why
numerous estimates and allocations can be made for purposes of cost
depletion, but are insurmountable for purposes of percentage depletion.
Another concern of the court was that lease bonuses are payable
whether or not there is production.12 Under prior law, lease bonuses
were eligible for depletion only if there was actual production on the
property. Where the taxpayer received the lease bonus prior to pro-
duction, he was allowed to deplete this income in the year of receipt.24
However, if the lease later proved to be unproductive, the taxpayer
was required to include the depletion previously claimed as income
in the year the lease was terminated."' The Court of Claims did not
explain why the recapture rule could not be applied to section 613A.
The Court of Claims' conclusion that lease bonuses do not qualify
for percentage depletion under section 613A was supported by several
reasons. One of the reasons was that the Commissioner "consistent-
ly" had advanced the same arguments in his various administrative
pronouncements." The court did not consider the bonus exclusion rule
of Revenue Ruling 81-266 to be inconsistent with either the Commis-
sioner's position in Farmar or Revenue Ruling 81-44."' The court also
considered proposed regulation sections 1.613A-3(a)(4) example 5 and
1.613A-7(f)(1) to be examples of the consistent approach taken by the
Commissioner."8 These regulations disallow percentage depletion on
advance royalties and lease bonuses because the payments are not
lease bonusCost depletion = adjusted basis xlesboulease bonus + estimated future royalty
Treas. Reg. S 1.612-3(a)(1) (1960).
Future royalties can be estimated to be zero where the lease is in a "wildcat" area,
and there is no evidence of conditions favorable to production. Collums v. United States,
480 F. Supp. 864 (D. Wyo. 1979).
Cost depletion can be claimed only where the taxpayer has a depletable cost basis
in the property. The taxpayer's depletable basis is the adjusted basis of the property
less the residual value of the land and improvements at the end of operations. Treas.
Reg. S 1.1612-1 (1960).
123. 689 F.2d at 1021.
124. Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
125. Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
126. 689 F.2d at 1025.
127. Id. at 1025.
128. Id. at 1025 n.13.
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received in the same year as physical extraction. The court, however,
did not attempt to reconcile these proposed regulations with regula-
tion 1.613-3(a)(4) example 7, which allows percentage depletion when
physical extraction occurs in a year different than the year in which
payment is received.
Percentage depletion also was denied on lease bonuses since the
court did not consider the payments to be based on actual production."2
The payments in Farmar were due whether or not there was produc-
tion on the lease. The implication of this interpretation is that if a
payment is not computed on actual production, it is not given for actual
production. This implication, however, conflicts with the historical
definition of lease bonuses. They have been defined as compensation
for the exploitation of minerals, even though computed on a per-acre
basis. The conflict created by the court's statement can be resolved
if "actual production" is read to mean actual production occurring dur-
ing the same taxable year payments are received. This reading,
however, would be inconsistent with the court's statement that percen-
tage depletion possibly may be available on an advance royalty,
because the advance royalty payment and physical extraction typical-
ly would occur in different years.
The reasoning of the Court of Claims, therefore, appears to con-
sider the method of computing the payment as the key factor in deter-
mining the availability of percentage depletion. This reasoning would
allow a payment to qualify for percentage depletion if it is based on
the number of units produced, regardless of when physical extraction
occurs.1" Percentage depletion, however, would not be available when
the payment is computed on some method other than actual produc-
tion, such as a lease bonus computed on an acreage basis. This result
would not be changed by production under the lease during the year.
The court did not explain why the method of computing the payment
should produce a different result under section 613A when the nature
of the payment is the same.
Despite the reasons advanced by the court explaining why lease
bonuses do not qualify for percentage depletion under section 613A,
the court's ultimate conclusion was that the taxpayer had failed to
carry his burden of establishing that the deduction clearly was
allowed. 3 ' The court had relied primarily on the statutory language
and, to a lesser extent, the legislative history and administrative pro-
129. Id. at 1021.
130. Id. at 1025.
131. Id.
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nouncements in finding that the statute required a direct link between
payment and physical extraction. The Court of Claims was not per-
suaded by the taxpayer's argument that the statute does not contain
such a requirement 32 or by his alternative argument that there was
a sufficient link between payment and physical extraction.
The Tax Court also has addressed the problems of section 613A.
In Glass, the Tax Court agreed with the Court of Claims and the
Seventh Circuit that the legislative history was not especially helpful."
However, unlike the other two courts, which found the statutory
language to be ambiguous, the Tax Court found the language to be
clear.
The Tax Court interpreted production as used in section 613A
to mean the actual physical severance of the mineral from the soil." 4
The court stated that the exemption from the general repeal is
available only if the payment is received "with respect to actual pro-
duction during the taxable year.""' As lease bonuses are not paid "with
respect to actual production," but for "execution of the lease,"'' 6 the
court believed that these payments did not fall within the exemption
of section 613A. In dicta, the court stated that the same rule applies
to advance royalties because these amounts are not paid "with respect
to actual production" as that term is used in the oil and gas industry."
The Tax Court would allow cost depletion, but not percentage
depletion, on lease bonuses. The court attempted to reconcile the dif-
ferent positions by stating that cost depletion is available to compen-
sate the taxpayer for the diminution in the value of his mineral in-
terest that is sustained by reducing his royalty share in future
production."8 According to the court, nothing in section 613A(c)
changed this rationale. Section 613A(c), however, did change the ra-
tionale of the percentage depletion deduction."' The court's interpreta-
tion of this statute requires that there be actual production during
the taxable year for the exemption to apply. Under this reasoning,
the allowance of cost depletion on lease bonuses does not conflict with
the denial of percentage depletion on these items.
The court's statement that cost depletion continues to be available
132. Id.
133. 76 T.C. at 955.
134. Id. at 955.
135. Id. at 952.
136. Id. at 957.
137. Id. 957-58 n.16.
138. Id. at 956.
139. Id. at 957.
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on lease bonuses is inconsistent with its statement that lease bonuses
are paid for the execution of the lease. The statement also is incon-
sistent with the historical definition of lease bonuses. Lease bonuses
have been defined by the United States Supreme Court as payments
for the exploitation of the minerals on the lease,14 ° not payments for
the execution of the lease. The court cited neither statutory language
nor legislative history to support its novel definition.
The Tax Court decided Glass on the basis of a statutory analysis
of section 613A."' The court supported its interpretation by stating
that there is no legislative policy supporting the taxpayer's position
and by citing the practical problems involved in computing the
limitation."" The court did not address the treatment of income when
production precedes income.
Conclusion
The key to solving the riddle of section 613A is defining the term
"production." This term, however, is not defined in either the statute
or the legislative history. The courts in the three cases analyzed herein
agree that production includes past and current physical extraction.
The courts do not agree on whether production also includes future
physical extraction.
The Tax Court, in Glass, defined production as requiring physical
extraction during the taxable year in which payment is received. This
narrow definition does not allow percentage depletion with respect
to payments received in advance of physical extraction, for it requires
both physical extraction and payment in the same year. Denying
percentage depletion on royalties when physical extraction occurs on
December 31, but payment is not received until January 1, produces
a result Congress clearly did not intend. Additionally, defining lease
bonuses as payment for the execution of the lease conflicts with prior
jurisprudence. Therefore, the Glass decision should not be followed.
The Court of Claims and the Seventh Circuit, however, each
presented reasonable interpretations. The Court of Claims considers
production to require a direct link between the payment received and
physical extraction. The court does not consider this direct link to
exist between a lease bonus and future extraction. This definition is
broad enough to allow percentage depletion on advance royalties. The
problem with the Court of Claims decision is not with the interpreta-
140. See text at notes 19-20, supra.
141. 96 T.C. at 954-55.
142. Id. at 959.
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tion of the statute, but with the court's treatment of lease bonuses
as being unrelated to production. A lease bonus, although paid at the
time of the execution of the lease, is not given for the execution of
the lease. The bonus is considered as given for the exploitation of
minerals, even though it is not traceable to a specific unit of produc-
tion. The result of the Court of Claims decision, therefore, cannot be
justified unless lease bonuses are redefined by the United States
Supreme Court or by legislative enactment.
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation is the broadest of the three
cases analyzed. That court holds that production includes future, as
well as current and past, production. The court regards section 613A
as merely placing a limitation on production measured by gross in-
come. This interpretation presents the fewest practical problems.
Physical extraction and receipt of income rarely occur at the same
time, especially in the case of a cash basis taxpayer. If production
is linked to gross income, the timing problem is avoided. This approach
also avoids the problem of distinguishing between past production and
future production. An interpretation which allows percentage deple-
tion in the former case, but not the latter, is not based on logic, but
on public policy.
Although no approach is flawless, the approach of the Seventh
Circuit should be adopted. This approach logically interprets section
613A and creates the fewest practical problems. This interpretation
also avoids the problem of redefining a lease bonus or any hybrid
arrangements which a clever draftsman may create.
Randy Paul Roussel
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